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Off-Balance-Sheet Activities and the Shadow Banking System: An Application 
of the Hausman Test with Higher Moments Instruments 
 
Abstract 
 
  The  noninterest income banks generate from their off-balance-sheet activities 
contributes greatly to the volatility of their operating revenues. Using Canadian data, 
we apply a modified Hausman procedure based on higher moments instruments and 
revisit this phenomenon to establish that the share of noninterest income (snonin) is 
actually endogenous to banks returns. In 1997, after the adoption of the Value at Risk 
(VaR) as a measure of banks risk, the snonin sign turns positive in the returns 
equations, indicating the emergence of diversification gains from banks non-traditional 
activities. ARCH-M estimations corroborate the idea that banks have gradually 
adapted to their new business lines, with an adjustment process begun even before 
1997. However, the banks risk premium associated to OBS activities has continuously 
increased since that date.  
 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
JEL Classification: G20; G21; C32.  
Keywords: Bank Risk Measures; Diversification; Noninterest income; Hausman test; 
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Résumé 
 
  Les revenus autres que d’intérêt que les banques dérivent de leurs activités hors-bilan 
contribuent grandement à la volatilité de leurs revenus d’opération. A partir d’une base de 
données canadiennes, nous recourons à une procédure modifiée d’Hausman basée sur les 
moments supérieurs pour établir que la part des revenus autres que d’intérêt (snonin) est 
endogène dans notre modèle de rendements bancaires. En 1997, après l’adoption de la VaR 
par les banques comme mesure de risque, le signe de snonin est devenu positif dans les 
équations de rendement, ce qui indique l’apparition de bénéfices de diversification dans les 
activités non traditionnelles des banques. Nos estimations ARCH-M corroborent l’idée que les 
banques se sont adaptées graduellement à leurs nouvelles activités, le processus d’ajustement 
s’étant même enclenché avant 1997. Toutefois, la prime de risque de marché associée aux 
activités hors-bilan s’est accrue continuellement depuis cette date.  
 
Classification JEL : G20 ; G21 ; C32. 
Mots-clefs : Mesures du risque bancaire ; Diversification ; Revenu autre que d’intérêt ; Test 
d’Hausman ; Endogénéité ; ARCH-M.   2
 
1.  Introduction 
 
  The recent credit crisis is mainly attributable to banks off-balance-sheet (OBS) activities, and 
in particular securitization, which has fuelled the last lending boom by enabling banks to increase 
their operational funding. This eventually led to a standard maturity mismatch and a liquidity 
crisis (Farhi and Tirole 2009, Gorton and Metrick 2009). At the core of the problem is the recent 
change in the banking landscape, which now, thanks to deregulation, comprises the whole 
leveraged financial system, including market based banking
1. This new type of banking, which 
Adrian and Shin (2009) call Shadow Banking
2, presents a considerable challenge to regulators. In 
the context of this new banking era, it becomes crucial to fully understand the behaviour of OBS 
activities. What we know so far is that the increase in banks non-traditional activities has had a 
strong influence on banks risk-return trade-off (DeYoung and Roland 2001, Estrella 2001, 
Acharya 2002, Clark and Siems 2002, Stiroh 2004a, Stiroh and Rumble 2006, Baele et al. 2007, 
De Jonghe 2009). It triggered a substantial increase in the volatility of banks net operating 
revenue growth, without a compensated increase in their returns (Stiroh 2004a, Baele et al. 2007, 
De Jonghe 2009).  
  In this paper we go a step further, analysing whether banks decision to diversify with OBS 
activities could actually be endogenous. Most studies of the banking literature assume this 
decision to be exogenous
3. However, since it is the by-product of a classical dynamic profit 
optimization problem, the decision to diversify should be considered endogenous instead (Campa 
and Kedia 2002, Baele et al. 2007, DeJonghe 2009). Indeed, changes in the risk-return trade-off 
ought to lead banks to adjust their share of noninterest income. As a matter of fact, there is some 
empirical evidence that banks rely more on OBS activities when they need extra funding
4. Banks 
could also use the diversification gains they make from their market-oriented activities to decrease 
the marginal cost of their risk and engage in riskier activities (Demsetz and Stahan 1997). For 
example, in the USA, larger banks are more diversified but many use their noninterest income as 
leverage to pursue riskier activities.  
  Needless to say, an investigation of the cyclical properties of snonin would certainly be 
worthwhile, however, our primary concern is not to build a financial soundness indicator (FSI) 
encompassing OBS activities
5, but simply to first check whether the noninterest income is indeed 
endogenous, and second, if such is the case, to propose alternative measures of banks risk more 
suited for modern macroprudential analysis. Our starting point is the idea that the interaction 
between banks risk measures and the noninterest income share might generate a serious 
simultaneity bias. On this matter Stiroh (2004b, p. 148) notes that, “This (interaction) clouds the 
interpretation between diversification and risk and could lead the results to be biased upwards”. 
One possible consequence of this bias might be that banks risk-return trade-off could spuriously 
indicate an overstated deterioration following the increase in noninterest income
6. In the context 
of banks diversification, this endogeneity issue is thus a very important aspect. Neglecting it 
might lead to spurious correlations between this variable and unobservables not accounted for in 
banks returns equations (Stiroh 2004a). In particular, the resulting non-orthogonality of the non-
                                                      
1 See Shin (2009) for a detailed explanation. For Canadian evidence, see also Calmès (2004). For the U.S. evidence, see, for example, Boyd and 
Gertler (1994). 
2 Securitized banking is also an expression used in the literature to refer to the banks non-traditional activities. Gorton and Metrick (2009) call 
securitized banks the institutions whom finance their portfolios of securitized bonds via repos (obviously a very risky collateral for repos), as 
opposed to traditional depository institutions that are regulated.  
3 Few noticeable exceptiona include Baele et al. (2007) (which uses a lagged regressor) and Busch and Kick (2009) study based on a TSLS 
approach.  
4 For example, this could be the case for mismanaged financial institutions (or the whole banking system, in periods of expected downturns). On 
this matter, see, for example, Farhi and Tirole (2009).  
5 Note also that banks may succomb to the temptation of creative accounting in difficult times (Chihak and Schaeck 2007). 
6 This is obviously the case when using estimation techniques such as OLS, which do not account for endogeneity   3
interest income share with the innovation in the returns equations can cause serious biases in the 
parameters estimates. 
  To tackle this issue, Stiroh and Rumble (2006) and Baele et al. (2007) introduce fixed effects 
or lagged explanatory variables in their panel regressions. However, this approach does not 
completely alleviate the problem. One of the main contributions of this paper is to propose an 
econometric framework to study this endogeneity question directly and more systematically. First, 
to analyse the endogeneity of noninterest income, we complete Stiroh (2004a) and Stiroh and 
Rumble (2006) by introducing a risk premium in the banks returns equations. Generally, banks 
risk is accounted for by scaling returns measures by their respective volatilities
7. Instead, we 
propose the direct incorporation of various banking risk measures in the returns equations, as 
generally done in the asset pricing literature. In this context, we introduce two alternative 
measures of banking risk, (i) one based on the market risk premium, the usual systemic risk 
variable appearing in banks returns equations; (ii) the other directly related to the volatility of 
banks returns. According to Stiroh (2004a), returns volatility is more relevant than the traditional 
market risk premium. It is all the more relevant considering that VaR, the standard risk measure 
adopted by most banks since 1997, is itself a measure based on returns volatility
8.  
  Second, we do not test for the endogeneity of snonin with the standard Hausman (1978) test. 
Since the h test tends to be less reliable when the covariance matrix is not positive definite, we 
instead propose a transformed version of this test. This modified h test is based on an artificial 
regression, equivalent to a TSLS procedure incorporating a direct measure of the biases in the 
endogenous variables coefficients. The instruments used to run this test are based on robust 
instruments built with the higher moments of the explanatory variables (Fuller 1987, Lewbel 
1997, Racicot and Théoret 2008).  
  Regardless of the estimation period considered, this version of TSLS reveals that the 
coefficient of the share of noninterest income of banks net operating revenues (snonin) is indeed 
overstated by the usual OLS estimations. According to Canadian data, this problem seems to be 
more pronounced in the first subperiod we study (1988-1996), when snonin has a strong 
significant negative impact on banks returns. By taking the non-interest income endogeneity into 
account, our findings reinforce the results the literature document on a negative relationship 
between banks returns and snonin for the 1988-1996 subperiod, and in particular the OLS findings 
of Stiroh and Rumble (2006). These authors find a negative, not significant, impact of snonin on 
banks returns, but in light of the new evidence we gather, we are inclined to think that the lack of 
significance of snonin they find might simply be due to their general treatment of the endogeneity 
problem. 
  Studying the more recent period (1997-2007), we also find that snonin continues to have a 
strong, significant, impact on banks returns. However, this impact becomes positive in this period. 
This change in sign relates to the adjustment process the banking industry underwent, with the 
progressive integration of the new OBS activities into banks traditional business lines, what 
Adrian and Shin (2009) call the shadow banking system
9.  
  In other respect, taking into account the fact that snonin is endogenous also leads to the 
conclusion that banks risk-return trade-off did not deteriorate as much as previously thought. 
Indeed, using an ARCH-M procedure, we find that  snonin endogeneity has a major impact on the 
risk premium required for the pricing of the risk associated to OBS activities. Whatever the banks 
performance measures we examine, neglecting the endogeneity of noninterest income results in a 
                                                      
7 Some authors use a measure of market risk as this is what investors care about; however, we favor accounting data, since, from the banks 
supervisors’ point of view, they provide a more informative picture about the ex-post outcomes. For a similar view see Stiroh (2004b).  
8 Given the highly nonlinear pattern of the returns volatility, we estimate this measure of banking risk with an instrumental IV ARCH-M 
procedure (Engle et al. 1987), to our knowledge, a new approach in this literature. 
9 Loosely speaking, this new banking is the result of a maturation process understood both as a progressive change in the banks activities mixture, 
and a learning-by-doing or learning-by-observing adaptation to new business lines. For more on this, see Calmès (2003), and Delong and 
DeYoung (2007).    4
non significant risk premium, whereas it is actually found significant when snonin is properly 
specified.  
  This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present some stylized facts about 
the behaviour of noninterest income, and introduce a factor model to study snonin properties. 
Then, in section 3, we expose the banks returns model and the modified Hausman method we use 
to test the endogeneity of noninterest income. We also detail how to construct the higher moments 
instruments used in the IV estimations. The fourth and fifth sections detail our results, while the 
last section concludes with final considerations. 
 
2.  Some Stylized Facts about the Behaviour of Noninterest Income 
 
2.1 The Change in the Noninterest Income Series 
 
Figure 1 Share of noninterest income for the eight domestic banks, 1988-2007  
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  Figure 1 illustrates the growth in the noninterest income share of Canadian banks net 
operating revenue. By 2000, noninterest income accounted for 57% of net operating revenue, up 
from only 25% in 1988. However, this ratio seems to have stabilized thereafter, as the new 
banking businesses matured. The ratio recovered somewhat after the high tech bubble burst, 
culminating at 60% in the first quarter of 2006, but decreased again, particularly during the recent 
credit crisis. More importantly, note that the fluctuations of the share of noninterest income are 
much larger after 1997. In particular, snonin became increasingly sensitive to the fluctuations of 
the financial markets after 1997 (Calmès and Liu 2009)
10. This tends to suggest the presence of a 
structural break around this date
11. This change relates to the better integration of banks OBS 
activities, and the gradual adjustment in the way banks deal with these new non-traditional 
business lines. The gradualism with which this integration operated can be explained by standard 
arguments, such as learning by doing, time-to-build or adjustment costs (Caballero et al 2003) 
among others. It can also explain why, in the past, few evidence of diversification benefits of OBS 
activities have been found in the data (e.g. Stiroh and Rumble 2006). As a matter of fact, in the 
United-States, financial deregulation sometimes lagged its Canadian and European counterparts. 
For instance, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), which allowed American banks to engage in 
brokerage activities (one of the most sensitive OBS activity), was not adopted until 1999, while 
                                                      
10 As a matter of fact, we find that there might be a cointegration relationship between snonin and the stock market index. 
11 The Chow tests we perform on the banks returns equations confirm the presence of a structural break around 1997. Liu et al. (2006) suggest 
another reason for the presence of a structural break around this date. Indeed, since 1996, the probability of banks failures has decreased in 
Canada because the OFSI has been given more powers to rescue a financial institution in difficulties, like the power to take control of an 
institution’s asset without having to prove that it is insolvent Another regulatory change was the introduction of the Prompt Corrective Action in 
the mid-1990s. With the help of the launching  of the VaR, these measures might have contributed to increase moral hazard in the Canadian 
banking system since 1997 and induced banks to take more risk, as shown in the tests appearing in our article.     5
the corresponding amendment to the Canadian Bank Act was promulgated almost ten years 
before, in 1987.   
 
Figure 2 Share of noninterest income in net operating revenue, three Canadian   
domestic banks, 1988 – 2007 
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Note: RBC: Royal Bank of Canada; TD: Toronto Dominion 
Bank; NBC: National Bank of Canada; TOT: eight Canadian 
domestic banks.    
 
 
  The post 1997 increased volatility of snonin series is more apparent if individual banks are 
considered instead of the aggregate sample of Canadian banks
12. As an illustration, Figure 2 
provides a comparison of snonin for three Canadian banks differing by size: a relatively small-
sized bank, the National Bank of Canada (NBC); a medium-sized bank, the Toronto-Dominion 
Bank (TD), and the largest Canadian bank, the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC)
13. Contrary to the 
RBC share, the NBC and especially the TD shares have become very volatile since 1997. The 
snonin of NBC  has remained on a volatile upward trend, before collapsing on the fourth quarter 
of 2007, while the TD share has decreased substantially since 2000. The dispersion in banks 
snonin has also greatly increased since 1997, perhaps an indication of improved diversification of 
the Canadian banking industry as a whole.  
 
 
                                                      
12 Due to data limitation, our study is only restricted to the analysis of aggregate data and we only display this figure as an illustration. In this 
respect, note also that there is some evidence for the benefit of relying on banks data on the aggregate level for macroprudential analysis. For 
example, return on equity is among the best indicators of the raise in systemic banking instability (Cihàk and Schaeck, 2007).  
13 For the fourth quarter of 2007, total assets of NBC, TD and RBC amounted to 113 billion $, 422 billion $, and 600 billion $ respectively. Their 
relative share in the assets of the pool of the eight domestic banks were 4.5%, 18.5%, and 26.2%.    6
Figure 3 Volatility of banks net operating revenue growth, 1984-2002 
 
  Since the volatility of snonin contributes to the volatility of operating income, we should 
consequently expect an increase in Canadian banks net operating income volatility after 1997. 
Going back to aggregate data, Figure 3 obviously supports this idea. Of course, the turmoil in the 
Asian markets and the high-tech bubble can be partly accountable for such fluctuations. But the 
increasing share of noninterest income is surely another important factor to understand the current 
instability in banks net operating income. In this respect, the adoption, in 1997, of the VaR as the 
standard banks risk measure has likely contributed to the increased banks income growth 
volatility because of its tendency to underestimate the negative impact of fat tails. Indeed, to 
compute their VaR, banks have been heavily inclined to rely on the middle range of their returns 
distributions, where most of the losses are located. But this induced banks to blindly engage in 
riskier activities, particularly OBS activities, and consequently increased their total leverage. It 
certainly explains a great deal of the increased banks income volatility, as banks overlooked the 
surging risk of their operations, in the immediate years following 1997, with VaR understating 
their true risk. VaR underestimates risk because the central limit theorem no longer holds in the 
presence of non-normal returns (Gabaix 2009). Hence, idiosyncratic risk is not fully diversifiable 
in this case. There are actually incompressible grains which reduce the diversifiability of 
idiosyncratic risk. If the returns are not Gaussian, VaR should thus be adjusted by a factor which 
Ebert and Lütkebohmert (2009) call a granular adjustment. This adjustment may likely boost the 
VaR.   
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2.2  The Snonin Factor Model 
 
Figure 4 TSX and Canadian banks share of noninterest income, 1988-2007 
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  Studying the share of noninterest income (snonin), first note that this variable is strongly 
influenced by financial and macroeconomic factors such as financial markets conditions, the stock 
market index, the interest rate and the industrial production index. Given these characteristics, we 
adopt a portfolio approach and specify snonin with a factor model much in the spirit of Stiroh and 
Rumble (2006). Among the factors influencing Canadian banks noninterest income, Calmès and 
Liu (2009) find TSX – the Toronto Stock Exchange index – to be one of the most significant 
explanatory variables. Plotting snonin against TSX, Figure 4 actually displays an apparent 
cointegration between the two variables
14. To confirm this, we run a cointegration test, first 
computing the residuals (epsi) associated to an OLS regression of  snonin on TSX over the whole 
sample period (1988 to 2007), and  then testing with the following regression 
 
1 () tt de p s i c e p s i γ ξ − = ++    (1) 
 
where d(epsi) are the residuals expressed in first difference. The estimated coefficient γ  of the 
lagged residuals is found significantly negative, suggesting that the residuals follow a stochastic 
mean-reverting process, and that snonin and TSX could be cointegrated. Consequently, we 
estimate the snonin factor model using the levels of these variables in equation (2). In addition to 
the TSX, the explanatory variables also include macroeconomic and financial factors such as GDP 
or the subprime crisis. More precisely, the snonin equation reads:  
 
01 2 . 3 4 15 ln( ) ln tt s o c t t t t snonin TSX robg d gdptrim snonin subpri θ θθ θ θθ ε − =+ + + + + +  (2) 
 
where robgsoc represents the corporate bond interest rate; dlngdptrim, the quarterly Canadian GDP 
growth rate, and subpri is a dummy variable accounting for the subprime crisis.  Note that when 
the TSX is expressed in logarithm, the R
2 of the regression improves. This confirms the nonlinear 
relationship between snonin and TSX.  
  We estimate equation (2) with a sample composed of the eight major Canadian domestic 
banks, running from the first quarter of 1988 to the fourth quarter of 2007. At first, compared to 
the US or the European banking sectors, the Canadian banking sector might appear quite small to 
draw any meaningful inference about the emergence of a new banking environment. However, 
our methodological choice, based on aggregate time series comprising more than 80 observations 
and a very parsimonious model, is more than enough to derive reliable results. Besides, the 
                                                      
14 Not surprisingly, Figure 1 suggests that the cointegration between these two variables deteriorated in 2007, when the subprime crisis unfolded.   8
Canadian banking system has the reputation of being one of the most robust system in the world 
(Ratnovski and Huang 2009) so that any trace of bank instability there is likely indication of a 
widespread phenomenon. In other words, if we successfully document the emergence of a risk-
premium associated to OBS activities, it should not be too surprising, applying the same 
methodology, to find the same pattern occurring elsewhere
15.  
  Data come from the Canadian Bankers Association and the Office of the Superintendant of 
Financial institutions (Canada). Since we identify a structural break in 1997, we also estimate 
equation (2) over the subsamples 1988-1996 and 1997-2007. Table 1 provides our results for the 
estimation of equation (2) using a GARCH(1,1) procedure. We test for other econometric 
specifications of conditional volatility, like GARCH(p,q), TARCH, EGARCH and PARCH, also 
using different distributions for the error term (normal, Student, and generalized error). However, 
based on the traditional measures of fit (e.g. Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn criteria), we 
find that the standard GARCH(1,1) specification offers the best fit of conditional volatility. The 
estimated residuals confirm the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity. In line with the results 
obtained when testing for the cointegration between snonin and the TSX, the R
2 of the regression 
is very high for the whole sample (0.97). Note that, when regressing with first-order integrated 
explanatory variables, spurious results may unfold since the R
2 could be high, while, at the same 
time, the DW statistic would be low. However, in the case of our snonin regression, the DW is 
equal to 2.15, suggesting the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals.  As expected, the stock 
market index is the most significant variable in equation (2). Over the whole sample, snonin 
appears very sensitive to the stock market conditions. The estimations thus suggest that banks 
revenues could be increasingly related to the stock market index. 
 
Table 1 Estimation of the snonin equation by a GARCH (1,1) procedure 
   1988-1996 1997-2007 1988-2007 
c  -40.08** -68.30**  -64.38*** 
ln(TSX)  6.95** 11.68***  10.28*** 
robgsoc  -0.31 -0.20  -0.43* 
dlngdptrim  -0.20 0.41 0.04 
snonint-1  0.55*** 0.33** 0.52*** 
DUM2Q  -0.73 1.41 -0.13 
DUM3Q  0.60 -3.83* -1.63 
DUM4Q  0.94 -3.57* -1.58 
SUBPRI   -3.44*  -3.75*** 
Adjusted R
2  0.88 0.78 0.97 
 
Note: The explanatory variables are the following: ln(TSX): logarithm of the 
Toronto Stock Exchange index; robgsoc: Canadian corporate bond interest rate; 
dlnGDPtrim: quarterly growth rate of the Canadian GDP; snonint-1: share of 
noninterest income lagged one period; DUMiQ: seasonal dummies taking the value 
of 1 on the i
th quarter and 0 otherwise (the first quarter being omitted); subpri: 
dummy variable accounting for the subprime crisis. This equation is estimated with 
a GARCH(1,1) procedure due to the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity.  
 
  The results also indicate that snonin is negatively related to the level of the corporate bonds 
interest rate. Indeed, the coefficient of robgsoc is equal to -0.43 in the snonin equation, and 
significant at the 90% confidence level. Increases in the interest rate tend to depress bond issues 
with a corresponding decrease in banks revenues from service fees. They also slow down 
                                                      
15 In this respect, Ratnovski and Huang (2009) mention that ‘’the Basel Accord requires international active banks to hold tier-one capital of at 
least 4 percent and total capital of at least 8 percent of risk weighted assets. Canada imposes capital requirements targets that are higher than the 
Basel minima: tier-one capital of 7 percent and total capital of 10 percent.’’   9
securitization, an important component of OBS activities. This negative sensitivity of snonin to 
the corporate bond rate might explain the observed negative correlation between the growth rates 
of net interest and noninterest revenues observed over the subperiods 1993-1997 and 2003-2007 
(Calmès and Théoret 2009). It suggests that traditional banking activities may act as a buffer 
during periods of adverse returns on OBS activities. Relatedly, the sensitivity of snonin to the 
interest rate variable remains negative in the most recent period, although not significant over any 
particular subperiod. 
  In other respect, over the whole sample period, GDP growth does not seem to significantly 
influence snonin, even if its coefficient is positive. This suggests a procyclical behaviour for 
snonin. Incidentally, the variable associated to economic activity, dlngdptrim, is not significant in 
the snonin equation, regardless of the estimation period considered. This might be explained by 
the fact that the influence of the real sector variables is already incorporated in the stock market 
index – a leading indicator of economic activity. Not surprisingly, the 2007 subprime crisis has a 
very negative impact on snonin, especially for banks whose exposure to the asset backed 
securities market was high.  
  Turning to the comparison of the results obtained from the two selected subsamples, on the 
basis of the adjusted R
2, we first note that the performance of the snonin equation is lower in the 
second subperiod. This can be attributed to the increase in the banking idiosyncratic risk 
component observed since 1997, as snonin became more sensitive to the stock market during the 
second subperiod. Indeed, the estimated coefficients of the stock market variable are respectively 
6.95 and 11.68 for the subperiods 1988-1996 and 1997-2007, and they are both significant at the 
95% confidence level. The fact that snonin is increasingly sensitive to the stock market might 
suggest that Canadian banks are more exposed to systemic risk than they used to be
16. This is 
symptomatic of the “new banking” era which emerged after the successive waves of financial 
deregulation the Canadian banking system underwent.  
 
 
 
 
3.  The Banks Returns Model and Snonin Endogeneity 
 
3.1 The Banks Returns Model 
  Following Stiroh (2004a), the general formulation of the relationship between banks 
performance and noninterest income we study can be expressed as: 
 
01 12 tt t t t y y snonin β ββ α ε − = ++ + + X    (3) 
 
where yt is an accounting measure of bank performance – e.g., the return on equity (ROE) or the 
return on assets (ROA) –, Xt is a vector of control variables, and εt is the innovation, or error term.  
Xt controls for factors that impact banks performance (e.g. bank size, riskiness of loans or asset 
growth). As a robustness check, and for the sake of consistency, equation (3) is first estimated on 
a risk-adjusted basis as was originally done in Stiroh (2004a) and Calmès and Liu (2009). For 
these regressions, yt is divided by a fourth-quarter moving average of its standard deviation. But 
since one of the main arguments we develop in this study is the idea that the increased volatility of 
bank operating revenues might have given rise to the emergence of a risk premium in banks 
                                                      
16 This fact has already been widely documented for other countries. cf. for example: Houston and Stiroh (2006), Wagner(2008, 2009), and Coval 
(2009a, 2009b). In particular, Wagner (2009), p.33, mentions that diversification in OBS activities ‘’makes banks more similar to each other by 
exposing them to the same risk.’’He shows that this increases banking systemic risk, as when one bank fails it makes it more likely that others 
will follow.   10
returns, we also consider a modified version of equation (3) with a specification of the risk-return 
trade-off according with finance theory, such that 
 
12 tt t rr i s k ψ ψμ = ++    (4) 
 
where rt stands for return, riskt for a factor of risk to which rt is exposed,  and  2 ψ , its degree of 
exposure.  
  For the latter set of experiments, two measures of banking risk are considered. First, in 
equation (3), we introduce the market risk premium, that is, the spread between the stock market 
return and the risk-free rate, so that equation (3), combined with equation (4), becomes  
01 12 3 () t t t t TSX TBILL t y y snonin r r β ββ α β ε − =+ + + + − + X    (5) 
 
where rTSX stands for the return on the stock market index, and rTBILL represents  the Treasury bill 
interest rate. On the other hand, banks measure risk with VaR models. Consequently, we also 
consider an alternative specification of equation (5), where risk is measured by the conditional 
volatility of returns. To capture nonlinearities
17, this measure of banking risk is then analyzed with 
an IV ARCH-M procedure. More precisely, we introduce returns conditional volatility in equation 
(3) such that: 
 
01 12 3 , tt t t c t t yy s n o n i n φφ φ υ φ σε − =+ + + + + X    (6) 
 
where σc,t, the conditional volatility, is computed using the following equation 
 
22 2
,0 1 , 1 2 1 ct ct t σ ππ σ π ε − − =+ +    (7) 
 
 
3.2 The Treatment of  Snonin Endogeneity 
  In this subsection, we detail how we construct the higher moments instruments endogenizing 
the snonin variable. Since the main focus of this paper is to study whether snonin endogeneity 
plays any role in explaining banks returns, we first want to introduce higher moments instruments 
for snonin, and then modify the returns model in several steps as discussed below.  
 
3.2.1 Higher Moments Instruments 
  Fuller (1987) has shown how the higher moments of the explanatory variables may be used as 
instruments. To explain his developments in a simple setting, consider a one variable model such 
that: , 1,2,..., tt t yx tn α βε =+ + = , where  ~( 0 , 1 ) N ε ,  and assume that { } 0 tt Ex ε ≠ , i.e. xt not being 
orthogonal to εt, and can be considered as endogenous. Assume that there exists a variable zt t 
which satisfies the two following conditions: { } 0 tt Ez x ≠ and  { } 0 tt Ez ε = . Then zt t may be used as 
an instrumental variable for xt. Assume also that the distribution of xt is not normal but 
asymmetric and leptokurtic. Since the distribution of xt is asymmetric, we have () {}
3 0 tx Exμ − ≠ , 
with μx, the expected value of x. This information may be used to build an explanatory variable for 
x.                         I f  w e  s e t   ()
2
tt zx x =−,  x  being the mean value of x, then 
() () {} () () { }
3 1 10 tx tz tx Ex z n Ex μμ μ
− −− = − − ≠ , and in accordance with the properties of the 
normal distribution: {} 0 tt Ez ε = . Thus, the second-order moment ()
2
t x x −  qualifies as an 
                                                      
17 Regarding nonlinearities, note that there might exist an optimal level of the share of noninterest income. Indeed, the relationship between this 
variable and the banks idiosyncratic risk feeding the error term is nonlinear (cf. Baele et al. 2007, and Wagner 2008, 2009).   11
instrumental variable for xt. By the same token, if the distribution of xt is leptokurtic, the third-
order moment ()
3
t x x −  also qualifies as an instrumental variable. According to Fuller (1987), the 
co-moment  () () tt y yx x −−  and the second-order moment of the dependent variable ()
2
t yy − may 
also be used as instruments.  
  One key advantage of using these higher-moments instruments is that they are based on the 
variables of the model itself, thus requiring no extraneous information. In the context of our 
model, resorting to higher moments instruments of this nature delivers a consistent estimator of 
2 β , the snonin coefficient of our model (in equations (3) and (5)). For the treatment of snonin 
endogeneity, we thus use the following set of instruments                                 Z = 
() () () () {}
2323
1, ,,, tt t t t x xx xx yy yy − −−−− , where xt represents any of the explanatory variables of 
the banks returns model.  
 
3.2.2 A Modified TSLS with the Hausman Endogeneity Test 
  To test for the endogeneity of snonin, we do not use the standard Hausman (1978) test but a 
transformed version of this test based on an artificial (auxiliary) regression. The standard 
Hausman test, i.e. the h test, is based on the following h 
statistic: () ( ) ( ) ( ) () ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ
-1 T
2
IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS h- V a r - V a r - ~ g ββ β β ββ χ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ , where  ˆ
OLS β  is the OLS 
estimator of the parameters vector;  ˆ
IV β , the corresponding IV estimator; and  ( ) ˆ
OLS Var β and 
( ) ˆ
IV Var β , the respective variances of the estimated parameters, and g being the number of 
explanatory variables. The Hausman test measures the significancy of the distance vector 
() ˆˆ
IVO L S - ββ . If the p-value of the test is less than 5%, the hypothesis H0 of no-endogeneity is 
rejected for a confidence level of 95%. However, as noted by McKinnon (1992), when the 
weighting matrix of the test  ( ) ( ) ˆˆ
IV OLS Var -Var ββ ⎡ ⎤
⎣ ⎦  is not positive definite, the h test is 
problematic. To avoid this issue, we resort to an alternative Hausman test. The modified version 
of the h test we propose is directly related to the works of Hausman (1978), Spencer and Berk 
(1981), McKinnon (1992) and Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998). To implement this version of the 
Hausman test, we first rewrite the banks returns model without a risk premium: 
 
01 12 tt t t t y y snonin β ββ α ε − = ++ + + X    (8) 
 
Since  () ,0 tt E snonin ε ≠ , snonin is an endogenous variable. A consistent estimator can be found if 
we can identify an instrument data matrix  { } 12 , ,..., k zz z = Z  – k being the number of instruments – 
to treat the snonin endogeneity. As discussed previously, this instrument set is the vector of higher 
moments Z. 
  The higher moments Hausman test is then implemented in two steps. First, using the 
instrument set Z, we compute the fitted value of snonint, noted  ˆ t snonin . Thus we regress snonint 
on the instruments vector Zt to obtain  ˆ t snonin , 
 
0 ˆ ˆˆˆ ˆ
tt t t snonin t snonin snonin c w snonin w ρ = ++ = + Z     (9) 
 
where  ˆ
t snonin w is the innovation resulting from the regression of snonin on the instruments set Z. 
Then, we substitute  ˆ t snonin  to snonint in the banks returns  model (equations (8)). This way we 
obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients of the returns equations.   12
  In a second step, provided that there is no endogeneity concern, we can substitute equation (9) 
in equation (8) to obtain the following artificial (or auxiliary) regression 
 
01 12 2 ˆˆ
t t t t t snonin t yy s n o n i n w β ββ α β ε − =+ + + + + X    (10) 
 
  Finally, using equation (10), we can build our endogeneity Hausman test with higher 
moments. Despite the evidence gathered in section 2, let assume for a moment that we do not 
know a priori whether snonin is endogenous or not, so that the coefficients of  ˆ t snonin and 
ˆ
t snonin w are not necessarily the same. In this case, we have to replace the coefficient β2 attached to 
ˆ
t snonin w  by θ, a mute coefficient, in equation (10), and thus have 
 
01 12 ˆˆ
t t t t t snonin t yy s n o n i nw β ββ α θ ε − =+ + + + + X    (11) 
 
With  ˆˆ
t t t snonin snonin snonin w =+ , we can reformulate equation (11) as follows: 
 
01 12 ˆ
t t t t t snonin t yy s n o n i n w β ββ α ϕ ε − =+ + + + + X    (12) 
where  2 ϕ θβ =− .  
  The endogeneity test is then expressed as follows. If there is no endogeneity problem, then 
0 ϕ = , or equivalently  2 θ β = . On the other hand, if snonin is endogenous, then ϕ  is significantly 
different from zero, that is to say  2 θ β ≠  in equation (11). One advantage of this procedure is that, 
beside providing an endogeneity test, it can also be used to gauge the severity of the endogeneity 
problem. Define  ()
*
22 ˆˆ ˆ f ϕ ββ =− , with f’ > 0,  2 ˆ β  the coefficient estimated by OLS, and 
*
2 ˆ β  the one 
estimated with the two-step Hausman procedure described above. According to equation (12), if 
ˆ ϕ  is significantly positive, this is an indication that the coefficient of snonin is overstated in the 
OLS regression, i.e. 
*
22 ˆˆ β β > . As implied by the definition, the severity of the endogeneity 
problem increases with  ˆ ϕ . The opposite argument holds true if  ˆ ϕ  is significantly negative. 
Finally, if  ˆ ϕ  is not significantly different from zero, then 
*
22 ˆˆ β β =  and there is no clear evidence of 
an endogeneity problem in this case.  
  As a final remark, note that, as implicitly suggested by Spencer and Berk (1981) and Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld (1998), the coefficients estimated with the auxiliary regression (12) are the same as 
those obtained from a TSLS procedure based on the same instruments used for the 
ˆ
t snonin w computation. If  ˆ ϕ  is not significantly different from zero (i.e. the case of no endogeneity) 
in equation (12), the OLS estimator obtains, and equation (12) thus becomes 
 
() 01 12 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ tt t t t OLS y y snonin β ββ α ε − = ++ + + X    (13) 
 
Instead, if  ˆ ϕ  is significantly different from zero (the case of endogenous issue), the TSLS 
estimator obtains and equation (12) reads: 
  
()
** * *
01 12 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
t t t t t snonin t TSLS y y snonin w ββ β α ϕ ε − =+ + + + + X    (14) 
 
where the coefficients are starred to indicate that they are equivalent to those obtained from a 
TSLS procedure. Consequently, our endogeneity indicator may also be rewritten as   13
() 2, 2, ˆˆ ˆ OLS TSLS f ϕβ β =− , which sates that  ˆ ϕ  is an indicator of the distance between the OLS and 
TSLS snonin coefficients. 
  In summary, the Hausman procedure we propose can be seen as a modified TSLS directly 
incorporating an endogeneity test. This correspondence between the Hausman artificial regression 
and the TSLS is often overlooked in the econometric literature. Maybe researchers do not realize 
that, by using this kind of modified procedure, they can directly obtain an indication of the acuity 
of the endogeneity problem. Obviously, for the estimation of equation (3), the standard TSLS 
procedure and this Hausman procedure are interchangeable. The estimated coefficients of the 
explanatory variables are the same in both cases. However, we favor the latter because it provides 
additional information about the endogeneity problem. 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
 
  In this section, we discuss the empirical results of the various experiments just described 
above, beginning with those of the estimation method most commonly used in the literature, 
namely the OLS, before presenting the results obtained from the IV method.  
 
Table 2 OLS estimation of the banks returns models: 1988-2007 
Canadian domestic banks        
   ROE(1)  R0E(2)  ROE/σt,uc  ROA(1)  ROA(2)  ROA/σt,uc 
 c  0.24*** 0.24*** 125.16*** 1.03***  1.04***  13.90*** 
 y(t-1)  0.14** 0.14**  0.07***  0.11*  0.1  0.66*** 
 snonin  0.11**  -0.11** -1.63** -0.39** -0.43**  -0.16 
 LLP  -0.14***  -0.14*** -0.79*** -0.55*** -0.57*** -0.08*** 
 rTSX - rTBILL    0.02    0.09  
 Adjusted R
2  0.68  0.69 0.64 0.70 0.71 0.50 
 
Note: Explanatory variables: yt-1, lagged dependent variable; snonin, share of noninterest income in net operating revenue; LLP, ratio of loan 
loss provisions over total assets; σt,uc, unconditional volatility of the dependent variable computed using a rolling window of four quarters; rTSX, 
return of the TSX index; r TBILL, Canadian Treasury Bills interest rate. ROE(1) and ROA(1) are models without the market risk premium; 
ROE(2) and ROA(2) are models incorporating the market risk premium (rTSX - rTBILL). Seasonal dummies were also included as regressors. 
Finally, asterisks indicate the significance levels: * stands for 10%, ** stands for 5%, and *** stands for 1%.  
 
4.1 OLS Results 
  Table 2 reports the results obtained from the OLS estimation of the banks returns model were 
returns here are proxied by either ROE or ROA, a standard approach in the literature. Since the 
results are very comparable with or without the introduction of a risk premium, we only discuss 
the case of the risk premium (the equation (5) specification of the returns model). We only keep 
the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets as a control variable because the other ones are 
found not significant. The fit of the model seems quite good over the whole sample period, the 
adjusted R
2 being generally in the neighbourhood of 0.70. Consistent with the idea that loan loss 
provisions ought to lower profits, the coefficient of the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets 
is found significantly negative in both returns equations, and equal to -0.14 for ROE and to -0.57 
for ROA, this last coefficient being about four times higher than the former, as expected. This 
could be expected since the ratio of ROA to ROE is mean-reverting to a level of 4 over the period 
we analyse
18, and also because of the low volatility of this ratio. Since the ratio of loan loss 
                                                      
18 For instance, for the fourth quarter of 2007, the ROE and ROA of the eight major Canadian banks were respectively 0.18 and 0.79. Given the 
tight relationship between the estimated coefficients of the ROE and ROA equations, we often limit our attention to ROA.   14
provisions jumps during recessions, it magnifies the procyclicality of ROA, which, in other 
respects, become more procyclical after 1997, following the banks increased involvement in OBS 
activities.  
  Table 2 also shows that the risk-return trade-off worsened throughout the sample. The 
coefficients of snonin, significant at the 95% confidence level in both ROE and ROA equations, 
are respectively -0.11 and -0.43
19. These results echoe those of Stiroh and Rumble (2006) 
regarding the sensitivity of banks returns to snonin, a priori casting doubts on the belief that 
noninterest income activities can lead to better bank performance through activities diversification 
(reduction in risk and/or higher returns). 
  In other respect, the coefficient of the market risk premium is positive but not significant for 
both  ROE and ROA. At first, this result might appear surprising in light of the observed 
cointegration between snonin and the stock market index. In fact, this lack of significance of the 
market risk premium is directly related to the endogeneity of snonin, precisely the aspect hard to 
capture with the OLS benchmark estimation. In this form, the model accounts for systemic risk, 
but a preferable procedure consists in deflating the banks performance measures with their 
respective volatilities (cf. Stiroh and Rumble 2006). Doing so, Table 2 reveals that the sensitivity 
of banks returns to snonin is negative for both the ROA and ROE risk adjusted measures, although 
significant for ROE only. This confirms that directly integrating a risk measure in the banks 
returns equations, and especially a global risk measure, might be a more convenient way to 
account for banks risk.  
 
Table 3 OLS estimation of the banks returns models: 1988-1996 
Canadian domestic banks       
   ROE(1)  R0E(2)  ROE/σt,uc  ROA(1)  ROA(2)  ROA/σt,uc 
 c  0.45***  0.47*** 18.62 1.85***  1.94*** 21.17 
 y(t-1)  0.03  0.02 0.76*** 0.04  0.03 0.75*** 
 snonin  -0.71*** -0.76***  -0.35  -2.79***  -3.02***  -0.40 
 LLP  -0.15*** -0.16*** -10.32*** -0.61***  -0.62***  -0.11*** 
 rTSX - rTBILL   0.04***      0.14**   
 Adjusted R
2  0.95  0.96 0.60 0.96 0.96 0.59 
Note: see table 2 
 
Table 4 OLS estimation of the banks returns models: 1997-2007 
Canadian domestic banks       
   ROE(1)  R0E(2)  ROE/σt,uc  ROA(1)  ROA(2)  ROA/σt,uc 
 c  -0.02  -0.02 20.19 -0.01  0  4.80 
 y(t-1)  0..21  0.21 0.80*** 0.08  0.09 0.65*** 
 snonin  0.39** 0.37**  1.32  1.59*** 1.53***  0.02 
 LLP  -0.12*** -0.12**  -3.04  -0.52***  -0.45**  0.01 
 rTSX - rTBILL    0.01    0.05  
 Adjusted R
2  0.47  0.46 0.67 0.45 0.45 0.44 
Note: see table 2 
 
                                                      
19 As expected, the estimated coefficient of ROA is again four times higher than the one of ROE.     15
  Since the data suggest the presence of a structural break in 1997, we also run our regressions 
over two subsamples, 1988-1996 and 1997-2007. Tables 3 and 4 provide the results obtained for 
these two subperiods. To begin with, note that the growth in the banks new business lines should 
imply a deterioration of the model performance when shifting from the first subperiod to the 
second. Indeed, we observe that the idiosyncratic risk prevailing in the second subperiod, as 
suggested by the volatility of the banks income growth, is much more pronounced, and feeds into 
the innovation term of the equation. It is during this second subperiod that Canadian banks begun 
to better integrate their traditional bank lending activities with their new banking business. When 
banks begun to operate these non-traditional activities, their risk-return trade-off worsened. It took 
them almost ten years to finally adjust to the new banking environment. The data track this 
change in the banking environment quite well. For example, in the ROA equation, the adjusted R
2 
is equal to 0.96 over the first period, and then falls to 0.45 in the second subperiod, corroborating 
the deterioration of the model fit.  
On the other hand, while banks non-traditional activities were developing, we also observe a 
change in the sign of the snonin coefficient. Since banks optimize their profits, the shift from 
lending activities to OBS ones has to be motivated by expectations of higher returns, and 
eventually translates into a positive impact of snonin on banks performance. Consistent with this 
argument, we find that snonin is only significantly negative during the subperiod 1988-1996, and 
becomes significantly positive after 1997.  
  Finally, in line with what we find over the whole sample, note that the sensitivity of ROA to 
the market risk premium is significant, but quite low in the first subperiod, and no longer 
significant in the second one. Actually, adding the market risk premium in the ROA equation does 
not improve the fit of the regression
 in any subperiod. We argue that this low sensitivity of ROA to 
the market risk premium is related to the endogeneity of snonin
20.  
 
Table 5 Comparison of OLS and GMM for estimating ROA equation with the market risk 
premium 
 
   OLS GMM 
   1988-1996 1997-2007 1988-1996 1997-2007 
 c  1.94*** 0.00 2.08*** 0.02 
  β2  -3.02*** 1.53*** -3.39*** 1.45*** 
  β3  0.14** 0.05  0.08***  0.15*** 
 Adj R
2  0.96 0.45 0.93 0.37 
 Note: the estimated coefficients in this table correspond to equation (5).  
 
4.2 Estimation of the ROA Equations with GMM 
  Table 5 compares the results of equation (5) obtained with OLS and GMM estimations. 
Focusing on the estimated coefficients of the share of noninterest income (snonin) and the market 
risk premium, the GMM estimation with higher moments instruments indicates that the sensitivity 
of ROA to snonin is equal to  -3.39 during the first subperiod 1988-1996, a higher level compared 
to what obtains with the OLS benchmark. The GMM method thus suggests a greater deterioration 
of the banks risk-return trade-off in the first subperiod. Corroborating our previous findings, 
during the second subperiod, the coefficient of snonin becomes significantly positive and quite 
comparable to the one obtained with the OLS estimation. Overall, the two estimation methods 
confirm a deterioration of the banks risk-return trade-off, followed by an improvement, a 
phenomenon consistent with the idea that banks went through a period of adjustment when they 
slowly adapted to their changing environment and integrated their new lines of businesses.  
                                                      
20 As exposed below, the alternative measure of risk we propose, i.e. the returns volatility, is much more adequate to account for banks 
risk exposure.    16
  Note also that with OLS, the estimated coefficients of the market risk premium variable are 
significant only in the first subperiod, whereas the estimates obtained from GMM are significant 
for both subperiods. The sensitivity of ROA to the market risk premium has actually doubled in 
the second subperiod relative to the first one
21.  
  Our results compare well with those obtained on US data by Stiroh and Rumble (2006). 
However, in the regressions these authors run, the coefficients of the snonin variable are positive 
and insignificant when expressed in levels, but significantly negative when scaled by their 
volatilities. Instead, when we apply their equations on Canadian data over the period they use 
(1997-2002), we find positive and significant coefficients for the snonin regressor with returns 
expressed in levels, but positive and insignificant coefficients for returns scaled by their 
volatilities ─ although they are significant with the GMM procedure. At first, the results Stiroh 
and Rumble (2006) obtain from the regressions on scaled returns might seem somewhat puzzling. 
When moving from returns expressed in levels to scaled returns, since risk, although imperfectly, 
is taken into account in the endogenous variables, their negative sensitivity to the snonin ratio 
should decrease, not shift from insignificantly positive to significantly negative. The results of 
Stiroh and Rumble (2006) are likely attributable to the lack of stability and high short term 
volatility of scaled returns. Their findings on the insignificancy of the snonin coefficient for 
returns expressed in levels may also relate to their general treatment of the snonin endogeneity. As 
our results suggest, thoroughly accounting for endogeneity strengthens the impact of snonin on 
banks returns, leading to more significance and/or higher coefficients (in absolute value) for 
snonin in the returns equations. 
 
4.3 Snonin Endogeneity and the TSLS Results 
  Regarding the endogeneity of the snonin variable, we report our results of the TSLS 
estimation for ROA (equation (12)) in Table 6. As previously explained, the Hausman procedure 
is very similar to a regular TSLS estimation
22. However, the Hausman regressions are preferable 
since they directly embed an endogeneity test based on the significancy of  wsnonin, as measured by 
its t-statistic, and provide an indication of the severity of the endogeneity issue with the level of 
the wsnonin coefficient.  
 
Table 6 Modified Hausman endogeneity test for ROA  
   1988-1996 1997-2007 
   OLS HAUS  TSLS OLS HAUS TSLS 
 c  1.94*** 2.00*** 2.00***  0.00  0.17  0.17 
 ROAt-1  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.13 
 snonin  -3.02*** -3.19*** -3.19*** 1.53***  1.16**  1.16** 
 LLP  -0.62*** -0.62*** -0.62*** -0.45** -0.49*** -0.49*** 
 rTSX - rTBILL  0.14** 0.15** 0.15**  0.05  0.06  0.06 
 wsnonin   4.93**    2.50*   
Adjusted R
2  0.96 0.97 0.96 0.45 0.48 0.44 
 
 
                                                      
21 Our alternative risk measure based on the return volatility corroborates this increased ROA risk sensitivity from one subperiod to the 
other.  
 
22 Since the results obtained for the TSLS and the Hausman procedure are essentially the same, we only report the Hausman procedure findings.    17
  As reported in Table 6, the level of the wsnonin coefficient indicates that the estimated 
coefficient of snonin is significantly overstated by OLS, regardless of the period considered. This 
result is consistent with the view that the snonin variable is indeed endogenous. According to the 
result obtained from the Hausman artificial regression, this problem seems to be more important 
during the first subperiod, when the snonin variable impacts negatively banks returns. In the ROA 
regression, the coefficient of wsnonin  is equal to 4.93 for this subperiod, compared to 2.50 for the 
second one. Furthermore, during the first subperiod, the coefficient of snonin is equal to -3.02 and 
becomes -3.19 if we account for the endogeneity of snonin. Taking endogeneity into account 
strengthens the results previously found in the literature, in particular the fact that snonin has a 
negative impact on banks returns in the 1988-1996 subperiod. More importantly, our results 
suggest that snonin has a positive impact in the more recent episodes. If endogeneity is 
considered, the impact of snonin is quite important in absolute value. Over the second subperiod 
(1997-2007), correcting for endogeneity slightly reduces the positive influence of snonin on 
returns, but its positive impact proves to be quite important and significant. This finding is 
consistent with the idea that the recent period has been characterized by a better integration of 
OBS activities with the traditional ones, and is also new evidence of the diversification benefits 
derived from banks non traditional operations.   
    
5.  Alternative Measures of Banks Risk  
 
  In the case of the banking industry, the idiosyncratic risks institutions usually face is not 
totally diversifiable (e.g. Stiroh 2004a) and thus must be priced accordingly. In this respect, a new 
strand of the financial literature argues that idiosyncratic risk is not totally diversifiable (Xu and 
Malkiel 2004, Hirth and Pandher 2005, Goyal and Santa-Clara 2007, Ebert and Lütkebohmert 
2009, Gabaix 2009). Consequently, the returns volatility might be considered a better measure of 
risk than the market risk premium we used so far, because the latter only accounts for systemic 
risk, whereas the former provides a more comprehensive assessment of risk. According to 
Markowitz, returns volatility overstates risk in the case of an individual stock or of an 
undiversified portfolio. Yet, in the presence of granular idiosyncratic risk, returns volatility is still 
preferable to market risk premium to measure banking risk
23.  
  In addition to these motives for adopting returns volatility as an alternative measure of banks 
risk, another consideration which justifies its introduction comes from the fact that, in 1997, 
following the recommendations of the Basle Committee, VaR became the official banks risk 
measure. Since the most important element of the computation of this statistic is precisely the 
volatility of returns, to be consistent with banks view on risk, it is all the more relevant to consider 
an alternative measure of risk based on volatility. Incidentally, VaR computation can be extended 
to account for the “granularity” related to fat tails
24. Insofar as VaR may be adjusted to become a 
more robust measure of banks risk, it is interesting to analyze the impact of returns volatility, 
viewed as an indicator of VaR, and analyze the impact of returns volatility on banks returns. We 
thus follow Calmès and Théoret (2009) and consider another measure of risk based on the 
conditional volatility of banks returns.  
  As we mentioned previously, the GMM estimations reveal that the impact of the market risk 
premium on ROA is quite small. This also tends to suggest that a risk measure accounting only for 
systemic risk is not ideal for explaining banks returns. For all these reasons,, we study the 
endogeneity of snonin with a modified ARCH-M procedure à la Engle et al. 1987, resorting to 
alternative measures of banking risk based on a more comprehensive view (i.e. the integration of 
the two dimensions of risk, the systemic and the idiosyncratic components). The ARCH-M 
approach allows the simultaneous estimation of the conditional return volatility and the coefficient 
                                                      
23 However, note that volatility neglects fat-tails risk.  
24 Another statistic which adjust VaR for fat-tails is the expected tail loss (ETL). On this matter, see, for example, Fabozzi et al. (2007).   18
related to this volatility in the return equation. It captures the nonlinearities created by the 
increased idiosyncratic risks observed in the Canadian banking industry after 1997. This 
procedure is very appealing to estimate the risk premium in this context because it directly 
incorporates the conditional volatility, our measure of risk, in the return equation, instead of 
running a regression on returns defined on a risk-adjusted basis, i.e. a measure of return scaled 
down by an "ad hoc" measure of its volatility.  
  In the case of the banks measures of risk based on returns volatility, the new benchmark 
model features a standard ARCH-M estimation, which, in its basic form, does not treat 
endogeneity. To account for the endogeneity of snonin, we then modify the benchmark model in 
two steps. First, much in the spirit of what we do with the modified Hausman test, we regress the 
snonin variable on the higher moments instruments, Z, and then, we introduce the resulting fitted 
value of snonin obtained from this regression in the ARCH-M equation. Thus, the modified 
ARCH-M we propose is an IV ARCH-M procedure which accounts for the potential endogeneity 
of snonin.  
 
Table 7 Comparison of ARCH-M estimations with snonin endogenous and exogenous 
 
 
   ARRCH-M snonin exo  ARCH-M snonin endo 
    1988-1996  1997-2007 1988-1996 1997-2007 
  c  1.71** -4.04***  1.90***  -1.96 
  2 φ   -2.69*** 1.24***  -3.70***  1.97*** 
  3 φ   1.26  5.62*** 2.07*** 3.87*** 
 Adj R
2  0.95  0.43 0.98 0.52 
                        Note: the estimated coefficients in this table correspond to equation (15).  
 
 
  Table 7 reports our estimation results with this IV ARCH-M technique. As the table shows, 
the results obtained are more significant than those reported in Table 5 for the GMM procedure. 
When shifting from the OLS estimation of the ROA equation to the IV ARCH-M, the adjusted R
2 
increases from 0.45 to 0.52 over the subperiod 1997-2007. If estimated with an IV ARCH-M 
procedure instead of the basic OLS estimation, the snonin variable displays a greater impact on 
banks returns. For instance, over the 1988-1996 subperiod, the estimated coefficients for ROA are 
respectively, -3.70 and -2.79.  Of course, a comparison of the results obtained with the IV ARCH-
M procedure with those of the benchmark ARCH-M is more appropriate. Doing so, we can first 
note that, regardless the subperiod examined, the impact of snonin on ROA is found significantly 
greater with the IV ARCH-M. For instance, over the 1988-1996 subperiod, the coefficient of 
snonin is equal to -2.69 in the ROA regression with the benchmark estimation, but to -3.70 with 
the IV ARCH-M procedure. We observe the same phenomenon for the estimated coefficient of 
this variable over the 1997-2007 subperiod, and further confirm the findings obtained in the 
previous experiments, observing the same change in the snonin sign. The estimated coefficient is 
equal to 1.24 with the standard ARCH-M estimation, but 1.97 with the IV ARCH-M. 
  Regarding the estimation of the risk premium, the results reported in Table 7 also illustrate 
how good a job the ARCH-M can do for capturing the nonlinearities created by the volatility 
jumps observed in banks revenues between the 1988-1996 period and the more recent episode of 
1997-2007. Indeed, these nonlinearities pile up in the error term of the returns equations, causing 
the residuals to be nonnormal and heteroskedastic.  Consequently, the coefficient of the 
conditional volatility estimated with the IV ARCH-M procedure is much higher, going from  2.07   19
to 3.87 over the second subperiod, and significant at the 99% confidence level. This is indication 
that the Canadian chartered banks increased substantially the risk premium they associate to their 
OBS activities over the second subperiod
25.  Obviously, the results also relate to the jump in risk 
witnessed during the second subperiod (as measured by the increased volatility of noninterest 
income growth).  
  Finally note that accounting for endogeneity also increases the sensititivity of ROA to its 
conditional volatility in the first subperiod. Indeed, the coefficient of the conditional variance is 
not significant when no account is made for endogeneity, but becomes significant when 
endogenizing snonin. Therefore, ignoring the endogeneity of snonin creates the false impression 
that there was no significant risk premium associated to OBS activities over the first subperiod, 
despite the increase in the volatility of the income growth generated by these activities at the time. 
Allowing snonin to be endogenous leads to the opposite conclusion. Even if much smaller than 
during the recent period, a significant risk premium already prevailed in the 1988-1996 subperiod, 
already beginning to compensate for the higher volatility of noninterest revenues feeding banks 
income. In other words, if we account for the endogeneity of snonin, the deterioration observed in 
the banks risk-return trade-off appears less severe than previously thought.    
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
  In this paper we revisit the banks decision to diversify in OBS activities, considering as 
endogenous the share of noninterest income these new lines of business generate. The results 
obtained when applying an Hausman artificial regression based on higher moment instruments 
suggest that the endogeneity of snonin may change the nature of banks returns sensitivity to 
noninterest income. In particular, the influence of snonin on ROE and ROA is stronger than what 
was previously reported in the literature. We find that snonin has a more negative impact on 
returns over the first subperiod, and a more positive effect  over the more recent period, 
suggesting that the banks risk-return trade-off was deteriorating over the first subperiod, before 
recovering in the second. 
  In other respects, we find that the risk premium, an alternative way of incorporating banks 
risk in the returns equations, has more impact on banks returns when considering snonin as 
endogenous. Not accounting for the endogeneity of this variable leads to weak and/or non-
significant risk premia in the returns equations, while they become significant when considereing 
snonin  endogeneity explicitly. The IV ARCH-M method we introduce to estimate this risk 
premium performs particularly well for capturing the nonlinearities created by the increased 
volatilities of snonin and banks income growth. Prolonging Stiroh (2004a) idea, focusing on a risk 
premium measured with the specific conditional volatility of banks returns is found more 
appropriate than using the market risk premium, so usually done to measure the sensitivity of 
banks returns to risk. In our case, the IV ARCH-M delivers higher and more significant risk 
premia if endogeneity is properly accounted for. Incidentally, when assuming snonin as 
exogenous, the risk premium is found not significant in the first subperiod (1988-1996), although 
the adjustment to the new banking environment was on its way. Instead, consistent with the idea 
that the shadow  banking begun to emerge in the first subperiod, the IV ARCH-M regression 
suggests that, even if smaller, a risk premium was already present at the time, pricing the greater 
volatility of the OBS activities that were increasingly contributing to banking volatility. 
  As a follow-up to the question we address in this paper, it would be interesting to study the 
snonin endogeneity problem based on the components of noninterest income. We suspect that the 
income related to securities trading, which much depends on the stock market, is the principal 
                                                      
25 Note that, although based on a different methodology, the results derived from these IV ARCH-M experiments can be considered as a 
corroboration of the results Stiroh (2006) obtains with U.S. data. In particular, he writes (p. 239) : ‘’The expansion of banking powers led equity 
market investors to become more cognizant with new and evolving activities and look off of the balance-sheet to identify them.’’    20
cause of the endogeneity of snonin. Another research avenue would focus on the nonlinearities 
created by the increased idiosyncratic risk generated by OBS activities. In this case, the Kalman 
filter could be used to analyze further the properties of the coefficients (their cyclical movement) 
of the returns regressions. These questions are left for future work.  
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